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NOTES
APPLICATION OF THE RULE IN RYLANDS V. FLETCHER TO THE
STORAGE OF GASOLINE IN AN AUTOMOBILE IN A PRIVATE GARAGE.-

The Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher' has recently been applied to the

keeping of an automobile in a private garage. 2 This extension
or rather modern application of the rule seems to be in accordance
with the English interpretation of it which holds that any use not
consecrated a natural use by immemorial custom raises an absolute
liability for any damage arising from such use.3 The question
has never been directly raised in the United States. There have
been, however, several groups of decisions that tend to sustain
1 L. R., 3 H. of L. 330 (1868).
2 Musgrove v. Pandelis, 2 K. B. 43 (1919).
3 59 U. of P. Law Rev. 320.

(157)

158

UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA

LAW REVIEW

a prophecy that the American courts will probably reach the same
decision, if the case arises in the same manner as did the recent
English case, namely where a mere pleasure car was the subject
of the discussion.
The American jurisdictions that have adopted the Rule in
Rylands v. Fletcher, in whole or in part, have generally tended to
soften its application in cases of commercially productive uses
because the economic necessities of this country have in the past
demanded that activity be encouraged to the fullest possible extent by refusing to harness these productive uses, with absolute
liabilities not based on fault.'

Furthermore, the country, being

comparatively young in its civilization, had no such ancient uses
as had England. Whether our courts therefore will deem the automobile as an instrumentality to be classified with the productive
uses and as such to be excepted from the application of the Rule
or as rather an instrumentality of such inherent danger in comparison
with its utility as to be within the Rule may well depend upon
whether the question is first presented in the case of a commercial
car or a pleasure car.
The recent English case was decided upon the authority of
two English cases, Vaughan v. Menlove 5 and Filliter v. Phippard. 6
The former case held that a hay-rick of green damp hay was such
an inherently dangerous object that it constituted negligence to
pile the hay improperly. The latter case held that a fire intentionally started upon one's land that later accidentally spread to
another's land was a case for the application of an absolute liability. In the United States, however, due probably to a misunderstanding of some "passages in Blackstone, absolute liabilities
in such cases have almost uniformly been refused. Though possibly originally decided erroneously this line of cases has become
so numerous and well accepted that there is no longer room for
doubt that they clearly express our law on the subject.7 It seems
unlikely therefore that the decision in the recent English decision
will have much weight with our courts, it being based on a line
of cases in conflict with our own.
As yet, there have been no direct decisions in the United
States which fix the status of the automobile within the purview
of the Rylands v. Fletcher Rule. However, there are certain
decisions which are illuminating as indicating the trend of the
judicial mind. While these decisions are not actual authority,
since the facts are somewhat remote from the automobile case
itself, yet their principle will perhaps be applied to the automobile
case and will be regarded as binding in the jurisdictions in which
4 59 U. of P. Law Rev. 373, 423.
53 Bing. N. C. 468 (1837).
6 ii Q. B. 347 (1847).
7 Clark v. Foot, 8 Johns. 421 (N. Y. 1811); Tourtellot v. Rosebrook, 52
Mass. 46o (1846); Fahn v. Reichart, 8 Wis. 255 (1859); Johnson v. Venenan,
75 Kan. 278, 89 Pac. 677 (1907).

NOTES

they have been decided. The storage of petroleum in tanks has
been held to be a use within the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher
in Minnesota and in the District of Columbia, s the damage occurring merely by reason of its fluid viscous qualities, and in Ohio as
an inherently dangerous inflammable substance. 9 The decisions
as to whether the storage of inflammable liquids, such as petroleum
or gasoline, constitutes a nuisance or a reasonable use seem to be
in confusion. While in the earlier cases there was a tendency to
deem such uses a nusiance rather readily, now it seems that the
commercial utility of such fuels is beginning to affect the courts
and to cause them to declare the use a reasonable one' unless the
circumstances of lack of safety appliances 2 or unsuitability of location'" are rather extreme.
In principle it would seem that the modern automobile has
been developed and perfected to such an extent and its use become
so general that the law in regard to it should follow in the footsteps
of the law developed in regard to other objects of great utility, but
at the same time to a limited extent inherently dangerous, such for
example as the steam engine and boiler. The language of Rol ertson,
C. J., in Lexington Co. v. Applegate 4 presents a well considered
and clearly expressed concept of what the tendency of the law in such
cases should be: "The onward spirit of the age must, to a reasonable extent, have its way. The law is made for the times and will
be made or modified by them. The expanded and still expanding
genius of the common law should adapt it here, as elsewhere to the
improved and improving condition of our country and our countrymen. And therefore, railroads and locomotive steam cars-the
offsprings as they will also be the parents, of progressive improvement--should not, in themselves, be considered as nuisances, although, in ages that are gone, they might have been so held, because they would have been comparatively useless, and therefore,
more mischievous." More recent cases have followed this concept' 5
and in Ohio which recognises the Rule in Rylands v. Fletcher it
has been held that a steam boiler does not come within the rule,
the court saying: "As an agent in the varied departments of industry, the steam boiler has become a necessity in modern life."16
Can it be said that the modern automobile is a less necessary object of utility than was the steam boiler forty years ago? Certainly the commercial truck appears to posses all the characteristics necessary to be fully covered by the analogy.
G. B.
s Berger v. Gaslight Co., 6o Minn. 296, 62 N. W. 336 (1895); Construction Co. v. Cumberland, 29 App. D. C. 554 (907).
9 Laugabough v. Anderson, 22 Ohio C. C. 278 (i9oi).
10 Regina v. Lister, 7 Cox C. C. 342 (1857).

11Harper v. Standard Oil Co., 78 Mo. App. 338 (1899).
12O'Hara v. Nelson, 71 N. J. Eq. I6I, 63 Atl. 836 (i9o6).
13Whittemore v. Laundry Co., I8i Mich. 564, 148 N. W. 437 (2924).
1,8 Dana 289 (Ky. 1839).
15 Baltimore v. Radecke, 49 Md. 217, 33 Am. Rep. 239 (1878).
15Huff v. Austin, 46 Ohio 386, 21 N. E. 864 (1889).
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THE TREATY POWER AND THE TENTH AMENDMET.-In 1913,
Congress passed an Appropriation Act for the Department of
Agriculture,' one of the provisions of which protected migratory
birds by fixing a penalty on anyone who destroyed or captured
them. A citizen of Arkansas was indicted in the U. S. District
Court for violation of the act 2 . Judge Trieber sustained a demurrer
to the indictment and declared the law unconstitutional, since
migratory birds are owned by the state in which they are found,
and regulations controlling their destruction and capture are a
matter exclusively within the state's power, and are not within the
province of Congressional action.
In 1916, a treaty was concluded between the United States
3
and Great Britain for the protection of certain migratory birds.
To enforce this treaty, Congress passed an act to protect specified
birds by fixing a penalty on anyone who destroyed or captured
them.4 Again, it was a citizen of Arkansas who offended and violated this statute; and again, Judge Trieber presided at the criminal prosecution. This time, however, the judge overruled the demurrer5 to the information, and thereby sustained the act of Congress .
Comparing these two decisions, it is at once apparent that,
in the court's opinion, a treaty is valid, and may be made effective
by appropriate legislation, although, if it were a statute, it would
be unconstitutional, as affecting rights exclusively under control
of the states. Or, in other words, the treaty power under the Constitution can abrogate rights reserved to the states, whereas the
power of Congress to enact statutes cannot.
Before discussing the relative limits of the treaty making
power and the power of Congress to enact statutes, it is necessary
to determine whether the subject in question, namely, the control
of migratory birds, is one which is exclusively within the power
of the states. If birds are the property of the nation, the states
would have no power to regulate or prohibit the hunting or killing
of them. But in every case in which the question has arisen, the
courts have recognized the rule that "animals, denominated as
game, are owned by the states, not as proprietors, but in their
sovereign capacity, as the representatives and for the benefit of
all their people in commom."6 This has had the approval of the
United States Supreme Court in every case which has come before
it. 7 The power to control the killing of game is nowhere in the
137 Stat. 828, 847, c. 145.
2U. S. v. Shauver, 214 Fed. 154 (1914).
3 39 Stat. 1702.
4 4o Stat. 755, C.28.
U. S. Comp. Stat. 1918, p. 1795.
56 U. S. v. Thompson, 258 Fed. 257 (1919).

U. S. v. Shauver, supra.
Martin v. Waddell, 41 U. S.367 (1842); McCready v. Virginia, 94 U. S.
391 (1876); Smith v. Maryland, 59 U. S. 71, 74 (1855); Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S.240 (r89o); Lawton v. Steele, 152 U. S. 133 (1893); Geer v.
Connecticut, 161 U. S.519 (1895); The Abby Dodge, 223 U. S. x66 (1911).
7
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Constitution delegated to the federal government. It was urged
in certain cases,8 however, that under the so-called "general welfare" clause, 9 the national government had this dormant right,
particularly since the national government could protect migratory wild game with a greater degree of success than could a state
government. This contention is best answered by the court's
opinion in a case 0 wherein a similar argument was presented: "But
the proposition that there are legislative powers affecting the nation
as a whole, which belong to, although not expressed in, the grant
of powers, is in direct conflict with the doctrine that this is a government of enumerated powers. That this is such a government,
clearly appears from the Constitution, independently of the amendments, for otherwise there would be an instrument granting
certain specified things made operative to grant other and distinct
things. This natural construction of the original body of the Constitution is made absolutely certain by the Tenth Amendment.
This Amendment, which was seemingly adopted with prescience
of just such contention as the present, disclosed the wide spread
fear that the national government might, under the pressure of a
supposed general welfare, attempt to exercise powers which had
not been granted. With equal determination the framers intended
that no such assumption should ever find justification in the original act, and that, if in the future further powers seemed necessary,
they should be granted by the people in the manner they had provided for amending the act." The reservation to the states of
the power to control the hunting and killing of migratory birds,
is therefore, "made certain" by the Tenth Amendment. An act
of Congress cannot usurp or abrogate that power. Can a treaty?
The recently decided case of U. S. v Thompson," referred to above,
holds that it can.
The Constitution declares 2 that the President "shall have
power, by and with the

.

.

.

consent of the Senate, to make

13
treaties". It expressly prohibits a state from making treaties,
and provides that "this Constitution, and the laws of the United
States made in pursuance thereof, and all treaties made
under the authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law
of the land."'"4
These phrases tell us simply in whom the power to make
treaties resides, to whom it is denied, and that a treaty made under
the authority of the United States is on a parity with an act of
Congress which is constitutional; and that the Constitution along
with them, is the supreme law of the land. No clause in the Con-

8 U. S. v. Shauver, supra; U. S. v. McCullagh,
9Art. IV, Sec. 3, sub-sec. 2.
10 Kansas v. Colorado, 2o6 U. S. 46, 89 (i9O6).
"1258 Fed. 257.
12 Art. II, Sec. 2, c1. 2.
13Art. I, Sec. io, cl. i.
1'Art. VI, c1. 2.

221

Fed. 288

(1915).
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stitution specifies what may be the subject-matter of a treaty.
But even those who would grant the widest limits to the treatymaking power do not on that account assert that the President and
the Senate have a limitless field of subjects about which to negotiate
with foreign countries. 15 On the contrary, all are agreed that the
treaty-making power has limits; but none defines those limits
clearly, and no two seem agreed on the line of demarcation between
what things can be done by treaty and what things cannot.
To the Constitution itself we must go to determine where
that limiting line is to be placed. In the second clause of Art. vi
we learn that" treaties made under the authorityof the United States"
shall be the supreme law of the land. So we discover that to be
a valid document, a treaty must be made "under the authority of
the United States."
Just what does that qualifying phrase mean?
Comparing it with the first clause of Sec. io, Art. i, which expressly denies treaty-making power to the state government, it
appears that these two clauses were meant to be in antithesis-the
one prohibiting the power to the state, the other granting it to the
federal government
The subjects over which the federal government has authority can be ascertained from the Constitution itself. Now, if a treaty to be valid must be under the authority of
the federal government, by the limits placed on the authority of
that federal government in the Constitution it can be determined
what are the subjects concerning which treaties can be made. In
a like manner, also, it is possible to fix upon those things which
cannot be made the subject matter of treaties by ascertaining what
authority is denied the fideral government.
The Tenth Amendment sets forth in no uncertain language
that "the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively, or to the people."
How, then, can a treaty which
abrogates one of these "reserved powers" be possibly construed
to be "under the authority of the United States" as required by
Article VI? The Constitution says that the state government
and not the federal government, shall have authority over such
things-and the Constitution is "the supreme law of the land."
One recent writer goes so far as to say that those "powers of the
states, having never been given up to the federal government, are
no more subject to that government than they are to the govern'6
ment of Great Britain. "
16The Cherokee Tobacco Case, 78 U. S. 616, 620 (1870); De Geofroy v.
Riggs, 133 U. S. 258, 267 (1889); Downes v. Bidwell, z82 U. S. 244, 317, 370
(I9O5); A. A. Bruce, in 45 U. of P. Law Rev. 693, 698; Win. Draper Lewis, in
46 U. of P. Law Rev. 73; 8o-82; W. R. Vance, in ioIllinois Law Rev. 679, 681;
Elihu Root, in i Amer. Jour. of International Law 273, 279; Butler: The Treatymaking Power of the United States, Sec. 2, p. 4; Cooley: Constitutional Law,
p. 103.16
Henry St. George Tucker: Limitations on the Treaty-Making Power,
p. 390.

NOTES

To carry their argument to a logical conclusion, those who
hold that Article VI is in no way modified by the Tenth Amendment must come forth boldly and assert that the federal government, by treaty, can cede a part of the territory of any state, or
indeed, all the state, to a foreign country. There are but few who
go that far. 17 The weight of opinion is against such an absolute
power.' 8 And, indeed, when the question did arise over the boundary in Maine between Great Britain and the United States, the
federal government did not even pretend to assert the right. On
the contrary, the Secretary of State asked Maine and Massachusetts to appoint commissioners, and assured them that no treaty
would be submitted to the Senate that did not meet their unanimous approval.19
It is a far cry from the vital question of ceding a state's land,
to the comparatively insignificant question of regulating the destruction of migratory birds. But they are one in principle; for
both are things denied to the federal government by the Tenth
Amendment. The most ardent champion of a limitless treatypower would not assert that the President and two-thirds of the
Senate, under the guise of making a treaty, could take from Congress the power of declaring war, or subordinate it in the exercise
of that power to the will of any other body, be it state, national, or
foreign. Indeed no judge, no statesman, no writer contends that
the treaty-making power can alter the form of our government or
the general departmental construction of the government, or the
constitution of any of the departments; or that it can deprive the
federal government or any of its departments of its delegated powers, or transfer such power to another department; or that it can
exercise a power confided to another department of the federal
government. 20 How, then, is it possible for the treaty making
authority to exercise a power prohibited to the federal government
or reserved to the States? For all these powers are apportioned
by the same Constitution; and in interpreting it, we must read
from all four corners, and give to each of its principles equal consideration and value. One writer picturesquely says: "If the
treaty-power may not invade the powers of Congress, or the Judiciary, or the President, would not the same prohibition apply to
any other branch of the federal government as well as to those?
Surely there is no peculiar sanctity that doth hedge Congress,
17 Lattimore v. Poteet, 39 U. S. 4, 13-14 (1840); A. K. Kuhn, in 7 Columbia Law Rev. 172, 179; Butler: The Treaty-Making Power of the United States,
Chap. XVI; Kent's Commentaries, vol. I, p. 167 note b.
18 Fort Leavenworth R. R. v. Lowe, 114 U. S. 525, 540-1 (1884); Geofroy v.
Riggs, 133 U. S. 258, 267 (1889); Downes v. Bidwell, 282 U. S. 244 (i9oo); A. A.
Bruce, in 45 U. of P. Law Rev. 693, 699; Henry St. George Tucker: Limitations on the Treaty-Making Power, Chap. X; Woolsey: Introd. to Study of

International Law, Sec. 103, p. 167.
19Works of Daniel Webster, vol. V, p. 99; vol. VI, p.

272.

For a complete discussion of these points, see article by Wm.E. Mikell
in 57 U. of P. Law Rev. 435 and 528.
20
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the Judiciary, or the President, which should be denied to the
states-as integral parts of the federal government. Must the
treaty-power timidly pause at the doors of Congress, at the threshhold of the Hall of Justice, or at the doorstep of the White House
and confess its impotency to deprive any one of them of one jot or
tittle of their constitutional power, and yet with measured tread
constitute the basic foundamarch ruthlessly over the states which
1
tion of the government itself?2
To maintain the unlimited supremacy of the treaty-making
power by deciding that it can abrogate the rights reserved to the
states, is to rewrite Article VI so as to read: "The Federal Government

.

.

and all treaties made under the authority of the

Federal Government, shall be the supreme law of the land." But
the Constitution does not say that. The Constitution, as amended
does not embrace federal powers only. It is an instrument which
reserves certain powers to the states just as much as it is one which
declares the power of the national government. The federal judge
protected those state powers against the act of the President and
a majority of the Senate and House of Representatives.22 To be
consistent-and incidentally, to follow the Constitution-he should
have protected them against the act of the President and two thirds
of the Senate.2
A.L.
THE CONTINUANCE TO WORK UNDER UNUSUAL ADDITIONAL
RISKS AS A BAR TO RECOVERY FOR PERSONAL INJURIES SUSTAINED.-It is clearly settled law in the United States that a party

subjected to the negligent act of another where a duty to avoid such
negligence exists is bound to exercise reasonable care to avoid injury as a result of such negligence upon recognition of the risk
Many recent cases, however, fail to fully
arising therefrom.
recognize the modern tendencies, which, without changing the
rule, have altered its application.
A particular example of this failure to recognize modern interpretations of old rules is the case of Hicks v. The Southern Ry.
Co.,' where the court held that it was proper to sustain a demurrer
to the allegations of the plaintiff that, while employed as a railway
postal clerk, he had contracted an illness as a result of exposure in
a mail car, which the defendant had failed to heat. In the language of the Court: "The law imposed upon the plaintiff the duty
of avoiding the negligence of which he fully knew; and since he
did not avoid it, he failed to use ordinary care for his own safety."
The sole point, upon which the conclusion of the plaintiff's contri412.

21Henry St. George Tucker: Limitations on the Treaty-Making Power, p.
4 U. S. v. Shauver,
supra.
"U. S. v. Thompson, supra.
199 S. E. 218 (Ga. i919).
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butory negligence can be based, is the mere fact of continuing to
fulfill his duty to the Government instead of refusing to work under
conditions which were probably an additional hazard but Which
were by no means certain to produce any positive damage. This
decision appears improper upon two grounds. First, the determination of negligence, either original or contributory, is a question
of fact to be measured by the rule of conduct of a reasonably prudent man, and as such the Court erred in not leaving its determination to the jury. Second, even if the allegations might be
deemed demurrable, the court fails to apply the standard of reasonable care in any logical or reasonable manner.
The practice of permitting demurrers or analogous procedures
to determine whether a cause of action or defense exists, is based
on the theory that the courts should not allow time to be wasted
by permitting juries to determine findings where, under the facts
admitted, there would be only a single conclusion possible in accordance with the law. These procedures were not created for
the purpose of transferring part of the functions of the jury to the
court but to have conclusions of law determined with a minimum
of delay. Recently they seem to have been permitted to prevent
excessive sentimentalism from effectuating injustice and producing verdicts not consistent with the law. Under the present accepted theory of the Jury System, however, the use of such pro-2
cedures should be most sparing when utilized for the latter object.
The true method of determining negligence, in cases of this
character, is to compare the conduct of the allegedly negligent
party in each case with the conduct of a reasonably careful man
under the circumstances in which the alleged negligent man found
himself. 3 This rule should be applied in accordance with the real
meaning of its wording, rather than in the somewhat artificial
manner that has been the practice of the courts in the past.4 In
the case under consideration, therefore, the true question is: Did
the plaintiff act as the reasonably careful man would have acted
when confronted with the choice of refusing to continue to fulfill
his duty of assisting in maintaining the postal service during time
of war or of continuing to labor under circumstances that might
or might not result in injury to himself? In Hicks v. The Southern
Ry. Co.,' this is the sole issue, as the demurrer admits the truth of
the allegation that the plaintiff had used all due care to avoid injury and there are no facts to controvert this deduction other than
the mere continuance to work. The opinion here like so many
opinions in cases of this character fails to recognize any distinction
between the two quite separate defences of contributory negligence
Harv. Law Rev. 147; Note, 13 L. R. A. 728; Note, iS L. R. A. 332.
C. C. & C. R. R. v. 'Ferry, 8 Ohio 570 (1858); Railroad Co. v. Gladmon,
82 U. S. 401 (1872); 9 Columbia Law Rev. 154; 62 U. of P. Law Rev. 320; 63
U. of P. Law Rev. 237.
' Railroad Co. v. Harmon, 147 U. S. 571 (1892); Darcey v. Lumber Co.,
87 Wis. 245, 58 N. W. 382 (2894).
24
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and assumption of risk and quite loosely terms the continuing to
labor with knowledge of unusual risk as carelessness amounting
to contributory negligence. In principle it would seem that if
the distinction is sound in the relationship of master and servant
there is no valid reason for confusing the two in cases of other
relationships. The former denies recovery upon the ground that
while the defendant has been guilty of a breech of his duty to the
plaintiff, this breach of duty or negligence would not have caused
the plaintiff any damage in the absence of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff or at least would not have been responsible
for the entire extent of the damage. The defence of assumption
of risk, on the contrary, is based upon the ground that the duty
of the defendant toward the plaintiff has become limited by the
knowledge of the latter that an additional risk exists so that in the
eyes of the law there has been no breach of duty upon which to
base a right of action. It is highly possible that the courts have
felt that this second defence is of such dubious legal validity that
they have deliberately refused to extend the doctrine to its logical
conclusion and have confined its application to cases of the exact
character in which it was first conceived and applied. Whether
the doctrine is accepted in relationships other than master and
servant is a rather academic question, however, as it is frequently
used as a basis for refusing recovery under the guise of the defence
of contributory negligence. Even under this disguise, however,
the determination to undergo some risk, if it is no greater than
that which a reasonably prudent man would deem justifiable to
accept and undergo, is not contributory negligence per se.5 Still
less is this the case where the party charged with contributory
negligence has a right to be in the situation where he was at the
time of sustaining damage or has a duty to perform independent
of his relationship with the party charged with the original negligence.6 In one case where a fireman was fulfilling his duty of attempting to extinguish a fire in a railroad yard containing amongst
other things a carload of explosives it was held that the jury was
justified in not finding him guilty of contributory negligence even
though he continued to work under highly perilous conditions
knowing that a number of explosions had already occurred. 7 To
attain a sound psychological result the courts should weigh in the
balance, as does the reasonably careful man, the importance of
duty to be fulfilled by the remaining at work in comparison with
the degree of danger and risk incurred by so doing. In practice
the courts tend to misinterpret the rules they lay down by almost
5 Mobile & B. Ry. Co. v. Holborn, 84 Ala. 133, 4 So. 146 (1888); Chielinsky
v. Hoopes Townsend Co., i Mary. 273, 40 Atl. 1127 (Del. 1894); Atlantic R.R.
Co. v. Powell, 127 Ga. 8o5, 56 S. E. ioo6 (1907); 2 Harv. Law Rev. 14, 91.
6 Heaven v. Pender, L. R., ii Q. B. Div. 5o3 (1883); Mason v. Yockey,
5O3 Fed. 265, 43 C. C. A. 228 (19oo).

Houston Ry. Co. v. O'Leary, 136 S. W. 6oi (Texas 1911); 66 U. of P.
Law Rev. 73.

NOTES

invariably considering that mere knowledge that a risk exsist
creates an irrefutable reason for cessation of the labor exposing the
injured party to such risk, failure to stop being deemed as sufficing
in law to constitute contributory negligence and barring a recovery.
As a matter of fact-the reasonably prudent man does not consider
the taking of some additional risks and chances at times for any
number of different reasons as carelessness, but rather on the contrary considers that various other ends for example as the retention of his employment as an important a part of his duty of selfpreservation as that of reducing to a minimum the necessary risks
of life. Conduct that was more prudent than this would not in
fact be that of the reasonably careful man but rather that of the
excessively cautious man.
G.B.
BILLS OF PEACE IN TORT CASES.-The doctrine that equity
will interfere to prevent a multiplicity of actions rests fundamentally upon the inadequacy of the legal remedy. The prevention
of such multiplicity is a persuasive, but not a conclusive argument
in favor of the jurisdiction. "The single fact that a multiplicity
of suits may be prevented by the assumption of jurisdction by
equity is not enough in all cases to sustain it."1 In cases where
one person is forced to sue many, or numerous persons are forced
to sue one, equity jurisdiction was originally exercised only where
there was a certain privity, common right, or community of interest in the subject matter between the numerous parties, such as
disputes between the lord of the manor and his tenants over the
customs of the manor, 2 or between a parson and his parishtoners
over tithes. 3 Such were the original bills of peace. Under the
natural expansion of equity, bills in the nature of bills of peace
were granted to prevent a multiplicity of suits in varied classes
of cases, in which there was strictly speaking no privity or common
right between the numerous parties, and where there was often
little more than a community of interest in the law and facts involved. Bills in the nature of bills of peace were allowed to establish
a sole fishery right against many claimants;4 to declare valid or
invalid certificates held by some 1oo claimants for injuries
occasioned by the bursting of a dam;6 to invalidate false stock
certificates fraudulently issued ;6 to enoin a nuisance affecting many
pio-erty hol(ers; 7 to enjoin a continuing wrongful act injuring the
property rights of many ;8 to enjoin suits against numerous insurance
1 Hale v. Allinson, 188 U. S. 56 (19o3).
2 How v. Tenants of Bromsgrove, i Vernon 22 (Eng. 1681).
Brown v. Vermuden, I Ch. Ca. 282 (Eng. 1676).
4Mayor of York v. Pilkington, i Atkyns 282 (Eng. 1737).
5Sheffield Water Works v. Yoemans, L. R. 2 Ch. 8 (Eng. x866).
6 N. Y., N. H. & H. R. R. Co. v. Schuyler, 17 N. Y. 592 (1858).
7Cadigan v. Brown, 120 Mass. 493 (875).
8 111. Cent. Ry. Co. v. Ga-rison, 81 Miss. 257, 32 So. 996 (i902); Ballou v.
Inhabitants of Hopkinton, 4 Gray 324 (Mass. 1855).
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companies when the policies were procured by the same fraud;9
to enjoin illegal tax proceedings. 0
The late Professor Pomeroy in his widely accepted work laid
down the rule that equity may and should exercise jurisdiction,
not only where there is a common right or a community of interest
in the subject matter, but also where there is "merely a community
of interest in questions of law and fact involved in the controversy,
or in the kind and form of relief demanded and obtained by or
against each individual member of the nimerous body."', This
rule has been quoted and followed in many cases. 12 It has been,
however, vigorously attacked, especially in cases of tort actions,
and particularly in a well known Mississippi case, 13 which argued
that Professor Pomeroy's rule was not justified by an analysis of
his authorities, a perusal of which would show that, if there was
not a community of interest in the subject matter, each of the numerous parties already had an equitable right and the problem was
merely one of joinder of parties in equity; furthermore that bills
of peace were never intended to join separate tort actions and that
right to
to do so would amount practically to a deprivation of the
4
a jury trial. This case has also been widely followed.'
The fundamental reason for equity's taking jurisdiction in
these cases is the inadequacy of the legal remedy. It must, therefore, be shown that the matter is more easily settled in equity,15 and
that the issues are simplified, not confused, as Professor Pomeroy
states in a section inserted in his work after the Tribettedecision. 6
It must also be shown that there will be an actual convenience
to all parties and that the material interests of none will be overlooked or obstructed. 17 'In negligence cases even though the injuries arise out of the same act, if the negligence of the tort-feasor
is established, the amount of damages in each case is still a matter
which the injured parties have a right to set before a jury. If a
court of equity were to refer this matter to a common law jury, the
latter would have before it a great mass of facts as to many separate
injuries. Under these circumstances the individual issues would be
9 Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Home Ins. Co., 113 Fed. I (1902).
10 Cummings v. Merchant's National Bank, 1ox U. S.153 (1879).
ILPomeroy's Equity Jurisdiction I, §269.
12 Carlton v. Newman, 77 Me. 4o8, I Atl. 194 (1885); Breimeyer v. Star
Bottling Co., 136 Mo. App. 84, II7 S. W. 119 (19o8); Town of Fairfield v. Southport National Bank, 77 Conn. 423, 59 Atl. 513 (1904).
13Tribette v. Ill. Central Ry. Co., 70 Miss. 182, 12 So. 32 (1892).
1"Cumberland Tel. & Tel. v. Williamson, ioi Miss. I, 57 So. 559 (1912);
Madison v. Ducktown, etc., Iron Co., x13 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (29o4); Turner v. City of Mobile, i35 Ala. 73, 33 So. 132 (I9O2); Southern Steel Co. v. Hopkins, 157 Ala. 175, 47 So. 274 (i9o8); reversed, I74 Ala. 465, 57 So. 1 (1911);
Hamilton v. Alabama Power Co., 195 Ala. 438, 70 So. 737 (I915); Vandalia
Coal Co. v. Lawson, 43 Ind. App. 226, 87 N. E. 47 (i9O9); Watson v. Huntington, 215 Fed. 472 (1914).
" Eureka & K. R. R. Co. v. Cal. & N. Ry. Co., io9 Fed. 5o9 (I9OI).
1 Pomeroy's Equity Jurisdiction I, §25132.
27 Hale v. Allinson, supra.
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apt to be confused, and if this were so, a bill in equity would be
neither more prompt nor more efficient than a number of suits at
law. Furthermore the equity court would not be bound by the
finding of a jury whose capacity is merely advisory. 18 The result
would be a practical deprivation of the right to a jury trial,19 an
objection which should prevent the exercise of jurisdiction when
there is a probability that the equitable remedy would not be
more adequate than the several actions at law. 20 If on the other
hand the question to be determined is the fact of negligence, the
deciding of that question by the court is also a deprivation of the
right to a jury trial, unless the evidence is such that a court at law
would be justified in directing a verdict upon it.21 Nevertheless,
if no negligence were found, the result would be a great increase
in efficiency and a marked simplification of issues.
In a recent case decided in the Federal District Court in Alabama,2? an injunction was granted to prevent the prosecution of
some I3O suits at common law, each alleging the negligent operation of the defendant's dam, whereby the plaintiffs' lands were
flooded and injured. Whether or not there was sufficient evidence
upon which to direct a verdict was not discussed, the court holding
that in their opinion the evidence did not support the allegation
of negligence. The court refers with approval to Professor Pomeroy's broad rule,23 and says that equity may exercise jurisdiction
"to determine the extent of the rights of the claimants of distinct
interests in a common subject." Stress, however, is laid upon the
common defense that there was no negligence, and the decision in
Hale v. Allinson,24 based upon the broad ground of the practical prevention of a multiplicity of suits without prejudice to the material interest of anyone, is quoted with approval. This is the first instance
of a court's exercising equitable jurisdiction to enjoin tort actions for
negligence, where there is a common defense that there is no negligence, although therehave been dicta to that effect,5and the principle
of common defense has been applied in other types of cases. 26 As the
first authority on this point, the case is interesting because it points
out an easily tenable middle position between two divergent groups of
opinion. Since it is plain that the equitable remedy in this case is
more adequate than the 130 suits at law, the fundamental purpose for
exercising the jurisdiction is realized. The only objection is that of
a possible deprivation of the right to a jury trial, which is of small
18 Raymond v. Flavel, 27 Ore. 219, 40 Pac. x58 (1895).
1
9

Vandalia Coal Co. v. Lawson, p. 249, supra.
128 Wis. 68, 107 N. W. 481 (i9d6).
It is interesting to note that under modern English practice there would

20 Johnson v. Swanke,
'

be no right to a jury trial in negligence cases. Judicature Act of 1873, order
XXXVI; rules 2 to 8; The Annual Practice (1919), p. 587.
2 Montgomery Light and Water Co. v. Charles et al., 258 Fed. 723 (1919).
Pomeroy's Equity Jurisdiction I, §269.
2ASee note i. supra.
25Vandalia Coal Co. v. Lawson, p. 256, supra.
28Virginia-Carolina Chemical Co. v. Home Ins. Co., supra.
2
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weight compared with thevery great increase in the judicial efficiency
which has been accomplished. Without any reference to community of interests, the decision in this case may be properly based
upon the broad equitable ground that a more adequate remedy
will in fact be supplied,
without a serious prejudice to the material
27
interests of any party.
F. H. B. Jr.
THE SCOPE OF THE FOURTH SECTION OF THE STATUTE OF
FRAuDs-The second clause of the fourth section of the original
Statute of Frauds, has given rise to many and various opinions by
the judges who have been called upon to interpret it, both in
England and in this country, where it has been2 substantially followed
in the statutes of the various jurisdictions.
It sets forth that "no action shall be brought .
whereby to charge the defendant upon any special promise to answer for
the debt, default, or miscarriages of another person . . . unless the agreement upon which such action shall be brought or
some memorandum or note thereof shall be in writing and signed
by the party to be charged therewith."
It will be observed that the phraseology is indefinite in three
particulars: (I)as to the person to whom the promise is made; (2)
as to the estate out of which the promisor is to answer for the debt;
and (3)as to the person by whom the promise is made.
In regard to the first and second of these particulars, all authorities are agreed in the interpretation. But the third has ever
proven a stumbling block. The difficulty is not evidenced so much
by the actual decisions of the cases turning on this point. On the
contrary, the great majority of courts seem to have had an intuition as to what was the correct result. But the trouble has always
come when the judges have attempted to assign the reasons for
their decision.
The opinion in the case of Cincinnati Traction Co., v. Cole,3
recently decided in the U. S. Circuit Court of Appeals for the Sixth
District, is a welcome one in this field. For by its clear language
and succinct expression, it should prove a great aid in clearing up
the confusion which has been occasioned by the opinions rendered
hitherto. It does not confine itself to any one of the three indefinite points afore-mentioned; but gives an illuminating discussion
and a satisfying determination of what is the correct interpretation of the statute.
It is evident that the statute refers to a conditional promise
only-to pay if the debtor does not. "A promise to be primarily
liable, or to be liable at all events, whether any person is or shall
27Hale v. Allinson, supra.
129 Car. II, c. 3.
2 In Pennsylvania, Act of April 26, i855 (P. L. 3o8).

3258 Fed. I69 (I939).
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become liable or not, is not within the statute."4 If it were, the
statute would include all promises to pay; so conditional promises
only are within its contemplation. It does not necessarily follow,
however, that all conditional promises to pay the debt of another
are within the statute, even though the words of the statute would
create that impression.
It says nothing whatever as to the person to whom the promise is made; and, therefore, a promise of the character called for,
made to any person, would seem to be within it. But from the
earliest case 5 in which such a strict interpretation was contended
for, all authorities have agreed that a promise is not within the statute unless it is made to the principal creditor. So a promise to the
debtor to pay his debt for good consideration, 6 or to a sheriff who
has a writ of execution against the principal debtor, 7 is not within
the statute. Lord Denman's limitation is the recognized law today: "The statute applies only to promises made to the person to
whom another is answerable. "8
The phraseology is indefinite as to the estate out of which the
promisor is to answer for the debt. But in the preceeding clause
of the statute, it is provided that no executor "shall be charged
upon a special promise to answer damages out of his own estate."
It is fair to assume, therefore, that the meaning of the clause under
discussion is that only where the promise is made to answer out of
the promisor's own estate, is it within the statute. Accordingly,
a promise to answer out of the estate of the debtor, 9 or of the creditor,10 which may be in the promisor's hands, need not be in writing.
Even without the words of the preceding clause as a guide, it would
be possible to arrive at this conclusion. For, a promise to pay out
of the hands of the promisor is in reality a promise by an agent or
a trustee of the debtor; and so practically.amounts to a promise
by the debtor himself to answer for his own debts. The statute
provides that it shall be for the debt "of another person." Therefore, the promisor must be acting, not as a representative of the
debtor but in his individual capacity, when he makes the promise;
and hence the promise must be to answer out of the promisor's
own estate.
As to the person by whom the promise is made, the statute
says nothing. To determine this, it is necessary to notice the object which was in view when the statute was enacted. Its ex4 Gibbs v. Blanchard, 15 Mich. 292 (1867); National Bank v. State Bank,
93 Iowa 65o, 61 N. W. io65 (1895); Lakeman v. Mountstephen, L. R. 7 Eng. &
Ir. App. 17 (1874); Wald's Pollock on Contracts (3rd ed. by Williston), p. 170.
5 Eastwood v. Kenyon, ii Adolph. & E. 438 (1840).
6 Oliphant v. Patterson, 56 Pa. 368 (1867); Bryant v. Jones, 209 S. W.
30 (Ky. 1919).
7 Reader v. Kingham, 13 C. B. (N. S.) 344 (1862).
8 Eastwood v. Kenyon, supra.
0 Throop: Validity of Verbal Agreements, Sec. 13; Pocket v. Almon,
90 Vt. io, 96 At. 421 (i916).
10Armstrong v. Bank, 195 S. W. 562 (Mo. 1917).
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pressed purpose is "for prevention of many fraudulent practices
which are so commonly endeavored to be upheld by perjury and
subornation of perjury.""

The thought in the minds of those who

framed the statute, then, was to safeguard the defendant from being charged with another's obligation solely on the testimony of
witnesses. If this protection is afforded by some other sufficient
means, does the statute apply? If there is another element which
renders the making of the promise more likely, if the making of the
promise is not dependent solely on the testimony of witnesses, must
the promise be in writing and signed by the promisor? Obviously,
if the conditions named be present, the statute is not required and
need not be applied. And such has been the current of opinion.
The courts, however, have not been clearly conscious on what
grounds the decisions can be justified. In one line of cases, the
ground expressed is that "whenever the main purpose and object
of the promisor is not to answer for another, but to subserve some
pecuniary or business purpose of his own, involving either a benefit to himself, or a damage to the other contracting party, his promise is not within the statute."32

Other cases hold that if a new consideration or benefit has
moved to the promisor, it is sufficient to take it out of the statute.
Chancellor Kent declared this as a general rule in an early case 13
but later decisions"s have held that if such consideration consisted
merely of harm to the creditor and was not beneficial to the promi16
sor, the promise is still within the statute. Still another opinion
is that if the promisor is to be held liable at all, it should not
be on
17
the promise, but in quasi contract for the benefit received.
Judge Cochran in Cincinnatti Traction Co., v. Cole, after a
discussion of these involved and confusing views, avoids them,
and adopts a position which requires no qualification, and which
is strong enough in its simplicity to meet the test of every case.
He declares his position to be that "it is the thought of the statute
that only a promise by a person who has no personal concern in
the creation or payment of the debt to which it relates is within
it." This does not read any exception into the statute any more
than do the decisions which require that the promise shall be to
1 29 Car. II, c. 3, sec. i.
12Emerson v. Slater, 63 U. S. 28 (1859); Nugent v. Wolfe, iii Pa. 47!,
4 Atl. i5 (1886); Kirby v. Kirby, 248 Pa. 117, 93 Ati. 874 (1915); 62 U. of P.
Law Rev. 314; 63 U. of P. Law Rev. 230, 339.

Leonard v. Vredenburgh, 8 Johns. 29 (N. Y. 18 i).
Riegelman v. Focht, 141 Pa. 380, 21 Atl. 6oi (r89r); Ames v. Foster,
io6 Mass. 400 (1871); Ackley v. Parmenter, 98 N. Y. 425 (1885); 8 Columbia
Law Rev. 236.
15Richardson v. Albright, 224 N. Y. 497, 121 N. E. 362 (1918) holds that
both beneficial interest to promisor and new consideration are necessary to
take promise outside the statute.
1823 Harv. Law Rev. 136.
17 33 U. of P. Law Rev. 21 for a general discussion of these various grounds
for decision.
13
14
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the creditor only, and that the promise must be to answer out of
the creditor's own estate. Like them it is but a limitation on the
scope of a statute which is unlimited in its phraseology, but which
is very definite in its underlying purpose.
So, to bring a-promise within the statute, it is not sufficient
that it is a promise to pay the debt of another. "Though it may
be a conditional promise, if it is not to the creditor, or not by one
who has no personal concern in the debt, or is not to pay it out of
the promisor's own estate, it is just as much not within the statute
as it would have been, had it been, not a conditional, but an absolute promise."18
A.L.
THE PENNSYLVANIA "STOP, LOOK AND LISTEN" RULE -To

hold a man guilty of contributory negligence by reason of neglecting
an act, the omission of which in no way contributed to his injury,
would seem a decision apparently absurd on its face. And yet,
by applying the "stop, look, and listen" rule as it ha3 come to
be understood by the courts of Pennsylvania, to the facts of a
comparatively recent case' the Supreme Court of that state has
arrived at just such a conclusion.
From the undisputed facts of this case, it appears that one
Benner was driving a one-horse buggy along the public highway
which led across the tracks of the defendant's right-of-way. These
tracks ran approximately north and south, and consisted of four
main tracks and two sidings, one of which stopped at the edge of
the public road. Benner, approaching from the east had, therefore, only five tracks to cross. At the time of this accident, the
crossing was not equipped with any safety gates, automatic bells,
flagmen, or other safety devices. Freight cars obviously not in
the process of being moved were occupying both sidings, and these
cars, together with various buildings and trees, made it impossible
for anyone approaching from the east to see either up or down the
four main tracks until he had crossed over the second siding. Benner passed by the first siding and drove on to the second siding,
reining in his horse before reaching the first main track. At this
point, the first from which he could get any view of the main
tracks at all, he stopped, looked and listened, and neither seeing
nor hearing anything, drove on. The buggy was struck on the
fourth main track by an express train travelling at the rate of fiftynine miles an hour, and Benner was thrown out and killed. The
engineer of the train had passed the whistle-board, some twelve
hundred feet from the crossing, without giving the required warning, and failed to give any signal until the train was only one hundred and fifty feet from the deceased. The case was submitted
ISThis section of the Statute of Frauds is the subject of a series of articles
by John Delatre Falconbridge, which is being presented in the current volume
of the University of Pennsylvania Law Review. (See 68 U. of P. Law Rev. i
and infra p. 137).
1 Benner v. P. & R. R. R. Co., 262 Pa. 307 (1918).
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to the jury by the lower court and verdict and judgment were given
for the plaintiff, Benner's wife. On the defendant's assignments
of error, the Supreme Court reversed the decision, and directed a
"udgment non obstante veredicto for the defendant, holding that
Benner was guilty of contributory negligence in law, and that the
case was wrongfully submitted to the jury.
Among other things, the court in this case pointed out, that,
by reason of a long line of decisions, the "stop, look, and listen"
rule in Pennsylvania has become so "inflexible"2 that if the injured
person failed to stop, etc., before crossing any of the tracks of the
defendant's right-of-way a nonsuit should be ordered regardless
of all other circumstances in the case. Two members of the court
dissented, Simpson and Stewart, J. J. In his very able opinion,
Mr. Justice Simpson bases his dissent on three main objections.
Of these objections, in the order of their apparent strength,
the first would seem to argue that the case was one for the jury,
because of the well-established rule in "stop, look, and listen"
cases that there is a presumption of proper conduct on the part
of the injured party, which is rebuttable 'only by evidence of the
defendant railroad to the contrary.3 In answer to this objection,
it may be said that the defendant, by his witnesses, produced
uncontroverted evidence that Benner did not do that which the
majority of the court held, as a matter of law, he must have done
in order to relieve himself of contributory negligence-namely,
stop before crossing the siding.
A second objection, founded on reason and analogy, is apparently far more difficult to answer, unless the case of Peoples v.
P. R. R.,4 cited by the m jority court, is authority to the contrary.
Mr. Justice Simpson argues that the distinction between the duty
of persons to stop before crossing railroad tracks on which trains
must move at high speed, and their duty to merely look and listen
before crossing trolley tracks, because the cars run at a less rate of
speed, should be applied as between the sidings and main tracks
of a railroad crossing. The comparability of a siding to a trolley
track in respect to the quantum of danger involved in crossing it,
is entirely logical as to the facts of the main case. It is conceivable, however, that the analogy might be more doubtful under a
different set of facts.
There is a third objection made by the dissenting justice,
which is conclusive. In the words of Judge Simpson, "To say
then that plaintiff cannot recover because it is alleged that her
husband did not do a useless thing, which no one else ever does,
is to punish her, though both she and her husband were innocent,
and benefit no one but the defendant, which, the jury has found,
2 Ihrig v. Erie R. R. Co., 2IO Pa. 98 (1904).
3 Longnecker v. P. R. R. Co., 105 Pa. 328 (2884); Hanna v. P. & R. R. R.
Co., 213 Pa. 157 (19o6).
4 251 Pa. 275 (1916).
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did her a most grievous wrong." According to the court's opinion,
the negligence of the deceased consisted in failing to stop before
crossing the siding, over which he passed in perfect safety. On the
other hand, his injury occurred on one of the main tracks, and
before attempting -to cross any of these, Benner did everything
required by law or reason to relieve him of negligence. Such a
conclusion would seem to be in violation of one of the most elementary principles of legal responsibility, for the so-called negligence of the deceased lacks the necessary element of being negligence dans locum injuriae.5 An analogous result would be reached,
if a court were to hold an automobile owner negligent for running
down a pedestrian who had jumped from the sidewalk directly
in the path of the automobile, provided it were proved that at
the time of the accident the car was likely to explode owing to the
negligence of the owner in not having it inspected.
A gradual tightening of the "stop, look, and listen" rule in
Pennsylvania is apparent from an examination of other comparatively recent decisions. In the case of Potterv. P.R. R., itwas held
to be contributory negligence in law for the driver of a horse and
wagon to stop so near the defendant's tracks that his animal,
frightened by the approach of a train, jumped forward, drawing
its owner in the path of the locomotive. The same year the court
made a similar decision in the case of a person who had stopped
twenty feet from a siding and forty feet from the main track,
holding that the distance was too great.7 And yet in a very much
earlier case, the court ruled, that if the question of what was the
proper place to stop was disputed it was a matter for the jury to
decide.8 It would seem that this earlier decision would have justified the court in the two more recent cases cited in relaxing the
growing severity of the "rule." Again, in Neiman v. D. &'H.
Canal Co., 9 the court submitted the case to the jury where the
evidence showed that the vision of the injured party was obscured
by escaping steam; and in a later case the plaintiff was nonsuited
for stopping at a point where his view was obstructed. 10 Another
very recent decision" has refused to consider an implied invitation
on the part of the defendant railroad to the injured party to cross,
by reason of the fact that its safety gates were open at a time when
they should have been closed.
Although Mr. Justice Simpson does not believe that the facts
of the main case bring it within the "rule," the following comment
upon the "rule" itself, quoted from his dissent, is indeed significant.
5Metropolitan Street Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 3 App. Cases 193, 47 L. J. C. P.
303 (1877); Baughman v. Shenango & Allegheny R. R. Co., 92 Pa. 335 (1880).
6 22I Pa. 550 (19o8).
7Walsh v. P. R. R. Co., 222 Pa. 162 (i9o8).
Whitman v. P. R. R. Co., 156 Pa. 175 (1893).
149 Pa. 92 (1892).
10 Mankewicz v. Lehigh Valley R. R., 214 Pa. 386 (i9o6).
1,Kipp v. Central R. R. Co. of N. J., 265 Pa. 20 (1919).
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"Since that rule was first adopted and published," says the Justice, "the members of thirty-one legislatures and one constitutional convention have been elected, met and adjourned, leaving
it still in force, and because thereof, despite doubts as to the wisdom of making it arbitrary, stare decisis compels our adherence
to it now, however much plaintiff may suffer by reason thereof."
At another place in his dissent Judge Simpson points out the fallacy of expecting the people to obey a rule which uselessly attempts
to delay them in the ends they seek to accomplish. If these comments voice the sentiment of the judiciary of this state, then some
legislative enactment would seem imperative to cure this growing
injustice.
Assuming that the promulgators of the "rule" had a double
reason in view, namely, the exaction of a higher degree of care from
the public, and the economic necessity of the time, visualized or
felt as public policy, since the railroads were recognized as public
necessities, their first object has not been attained. The everincreasing number of accidents at grade crossings bears witness to
this. Nor does public policy require that the railroads should
continue to be protected in this manner.
C. W.B.T.
PHYSICAL INJURY DUE TO SPOKEN WoRD.-The courts in

the administration of justice must deal with all sorts and conditions of men. Mankind is made up of individuals and most cases
at law present two or more individuals in some particular relationship. But the law is concerned with mankind as a whole,
with the ordinary man, and its principles and rules are established
for ordinary men of average mental and physical equipment.1
Therefore the law refuses to listen to complaints based on injuries
which were suffered only because of the supersensitive tempera-2
ment or the abnormal physical condition of the person harmed.
In such cases it is said that the result is not to be reasonably anticipated, is unexpected and unusual; the chain of causation is
beyond the control of the person at fault and the damage is too
indirect and remote to create liability.
This insistence upon the average man as the norm or standard is especially important in a class of cases where the personal
equation is necessarily involved, those cases in which the action
is based on liability for fright, or a nervous or mental shock or
mental anguish. Whether there is any liability in such cases
dependq first of all on the question whether an ordinary man would
have sustained any injury from the alleged cause.3 "The shock,
whe-e it operates through the mind, must be a shock which arises
from a reasonable fear of immediate personal injury to oneself."'
I Bouvier, Law Dictionary; see "Negligence," "Skill," etc.
2 Nelson v. Crawford, r22 Mich. 466, 8i N. W. 335 (1899); Braun v. Craven, 175 Ill. 401, 51 N. E. 6.57 (1898).
Nelson v. Crawford, supra; Braun v. Craven, supra.
4 Kennedy, J., in Dulieu v. White, (1901) 2 K. B. 669, at page 675.
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The expressions "fright," "mental anguish," and like terms are
used with no apparent discrimination when the immediate effect
of the wilful misconduct or negligence of the defendant is a shock
to the nervous system of the plaintiff, without any direct physical
impact or assault upon the body of the plaintiff.5
Fright and nervous shock, if no other injury is sustained,
are not enough in themselves to form the basis of an action for
damages.6 This is because a claim based on fright or nervous
shock, without any resulting or attendant physical injury is hard
to disprove and the courts look with suspicion on such cases. It
is almost impossible to establish fraud under such circumstances,
however strongly suspected. All the evidence is in the mind of
the plaintiff, and, if such cases were actionable, the court would be
forced to rely solely on his veracity.
When physical injury follows as a natural consequence of
fright, nervous shock or mental anguish, the plaintiff has a much
better claim to present. He has evidence to offer as to how seriously he was harmed by the defendant's tort. But here the cases
make a distinction between negligent acts and wilful acts as a
cause of the physical injury to the plaintiff. Whether an act of
negligence on the part of the defendant, resulting in a nervous
shock to the plaintiff which is attended by physical injury, is
actionable has been a much disputed question. "A recovery has
been allowed by the Court of King's Bench in England, .
the Supreme Courts of Texas, Minnesota and South Carolina. A
recovery has been denied by the Privy Council, England, and the7
Supreme Courts of New York, Pennsylvania and Massachusetts."'
The conflict of opinions seems to be due to the fact that the courts
approach the problem with different conceptions of legal injury
and proximate cause.
But when the fright and the resulting physical injury are
occasioned by a deliberate and wilful tort, it is well settled that
an action will lie.8 Any act done with the malicious purpose of
frightening the plaintiff and which could be reasonably calculated
to cause physical injury because of a shock resulting therefrom,
would be a sufficient foundation for such a case. It has been held
that spoken words, if maliciously made and if they could be reasonably expected to frighten a person, are actionable if. they did cause
physical harm. 9
Interest in this whole problem is revived by the decision in
Janvier v. Sweeney and Barker, 10 where the court held that the
55 Columbia Law Rev. 179.
0 Burdick's Torts, 3rd Ed., Sec. ii, p. 113; 14 L. R. A. 666 and cases therein
cited; Railroad Company vs. Dalton, 65 Kan. 661, 70 Pac. 645 (1902).
7Francis H. Bohlen in 50 Am. Law Reg. 141 and cases therein cited;
22 L. R. A., N. S., 1073.

OPreiser v. Wielandt, 48 App. Div. N. Y. 569,62 N. Y. S. 89o (I9OO); Watson v. Dilts, 1I6 Iowa 249, 89 N. XV. lO68 (19o2).
9Wilkinson v. Downton, 76 L. T. R. 493 (Eng. 1897).
10 121 L. T. R. 179 (Eng. 1919).
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plaintiff could recover for physical injury caused by threats and
spoken words. There was no evidence that the plaintiff was in
obvious ill-health or of extreme nervous temperament. The case
shows how far the court can go in establishing liability under such
circumstances and yet stay well within the precedents. The
defendant Barker told the plaintiff that he represented the military authorities and that she was wanted because she had been
corresponding with a German spy. The jury found that the statements were calculated to cause physical injury to the plaintiff
and were maliciously made, with the knowledge that they were
likely to cause such damage.
The decision is in accord with the rule that when a person
has been frightened wilfully and intentionally and he suffers a
physical injury which could be inferred as likely to result therefrom, he can recover. Moreover the English court had authority
almost exactly in point with the principal case: the case of Wilkinson v. Downton,11 in which the defendant intended to subject
the plaintiff to fright which, in the opinion of the jury, was so severe
that an ordinary man would realize that it might and would occasion serious physical consequences to the plaintiff. The court,
in the case under discussion, followed the previous decision and
quoted it. The only distinction between the two cases being that,
in the principal case, while the defendant's conduct was a wrong
in itself in that the threats were made to the plaintiff to induce
her to steal from her employer letters which the defendant wanted
to obtain, his conduct was not a wrong towards the plaintiff apart
from the tendency to cause fright, while in the Wilkinson case the
defendant had, as a joke; practiced fraud on the plaintiff by telling
her that her husband had been seriously injured in a railway accident. The case under discussion therefore goes further than the
previous decision, in that here there was no wrong done to the
plaintiff apart from the tendency of the defendant's words to cause
her physical injury through fright which he wilfully intended to
create in her.
There is no logical reason why the connection between certain statements made to a person and the illness of that person
should be considered too remote for the law to be concerned with.
"Remoteness as a legal ground for the exclusion of damage in
an action of tort means, not severance in point of time, but the
absence of direct and natural causal sequence-the inability to
trace in regard to the damage propter hoc in a necessary or natural
descent from the wrongful act." 12 In the case of Dulieu v. White, 13
Kennedy, J. cites an unreported case, Smith v. Johnson & Co.,
referred to in Wilkinson v. Downton, in which a bystander suffered
serious physical illness from horror due to witnessing an accident
n Supra.
12 Kennedy, J., in Dulieu v. White, supra, at p. 678.
13Supra, at p. 675.
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caused by the defendant; he distinguishes this case from Dulieu v.
White on the ground that the defendant was guilty of no wrong
to the plaintiff, since there was no reason to anticipate at the time
he was guilty of the negligence which caused the accident, that the
accident would be of such a terrible nature that a mere bystander
would be so shocked at seeing the accident as to suffer physical
injury. Whereas in Dulieu v. White the conduct of the defendant
threatened direct physical injury to the plaintiff and so was wrongful to him, apart from the mere possibility that he would be so
seriously frightened as to be physically injured.
Spoken words can easily start a train of events which ends in
physical injury and it is often easy, in cases like the one under
discussion, to trace the physical injury by natural steps back to
the words used. When one considers that England was at war
at the time, it is not strange that the woman was greatly frightened; an ordinary person would be certain to suffer a shock from
such an accusation, and that illness resulted is not at all surprising. Add to these factors the elements of malicious purpose
and knowledge that such accusations were likely to cause physical
injury, facts found by the jury, and the conclusion is evident:
if the physical illness was the direct result of the nervous shock
caused by the statements made to her by the defendant, the plaintiff had a right to recover. "The true question would seem to be
whether the fear in which the plaintiff was put by the defendant's
wrongful or negligent conduct was such as, in the circumstances,
would naturally be suffered by a person of ordinary courage and
temper, and such as might thereupon naturally and probably
lead in the plaintiff's case to the physical effects complained of."'14
All of these things were found in the case under discussion.
Cases, in which physical injury resulting from spoken words
is made the cause of an action, are rare. When the words are
not spoken directly to the plaintiff, an action based on illness or
shock resulting therefrom may be denied without conflict with the
principal case, on the ground that there is no misconduct towards
the person injured."5 But when the words are spoken to the plaintiff wilfully and with an intention of causing fright, then there is
no reason why the usual rules for tort liability should not be applied,
and if a case is made out, the fact that spoken words were the origin
of the injury should not affect the result. The rules are broad
enough to include such a case and, in England at least, there is
authority for such a decision.
E. L. P.
THE BURDEN OF PROOF WHERE THERE HAS BEEN Loss By
BAILEE.-Agistment, both at common law and by statute, is
universally treated and considered as one species of bailment, and
14Pollock, Torts, 9th Ed., 53.
15Bucknam v. Great Northern Ry., 76 Minn. 373, 79 N. W. 98 (1899);
25 Ind.App. 584, 58 N. E. 740 (1900).
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the liabilities of agisters do not in the main differ from those of
other bailees for hire.' In the absence of a special contract an
agister is not an insurer of the safety of the animals intrusted to
him. He takes them on an implied contract that he will look after
,:hem with ordinary diligence and reasonable care, and therefore
he is only bound to exercise that degree of care which a man of
ordinary prudence would use under the same circumstances towards
his own property. 2 One of the essential parts of every contract
of bailment is the obligation to redeliver the property on demand
at the termination of the bailment, and if the bailee fails to do so,
he is liable unless he can show that his inability arises without
fault on his part. The difficult question to determine, as in many
other forms of bailment, is which party has the burden of proof.
Where there is a special contract by which the agister undertakes
to return the property, which amounts to a guaranty, he has the
burden of accounting for the same. 3 But with this exception,
there is undoubtedly an elementary rule of law, that in all actions
founded upon negligence, or a culpable breach of duty, the burden
is on the plaintiff to establish negligence. There is, however, a
decided conflict as to whether the loss, while in the bailee's possession, raises such a presumption of negligence on his part as to
establish a prima facie case against him.
There is one line of decisions which holds the burden of
proving negligence rests on the plaintiff throughout, and that when
an agister is sued for a negligent loss, the mere proof of the loss
does not make out a prima facie case, the plaintiff being required
to show that it was the result of a failure on the part of the defendant to exercise the reasonable care and diligence imposed on him
by the nature of his undertaking. 4 On the other hand, the better
and more modern rule modifies the preceding one in that the
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case by showing that the property
delivered to the agister was not delivered back to him on demand.5
This is on the theory that the bailee's failure to redeliver raises the
presumption that the loss was due to his own negligence. The
most troublesome question occurs at just this stage of the proceedings. Must the bailee overcome this prima facie presumption
by showing that the loss or damage was consistent with the ab' Cotton v. Arnold, Ii Mo. App. 596, 95 S. W. 280 (19o6); Wilensky v.

Martin, 6o S. E. 1074 (Ga. 19o8).
2Smith v. Cook, i Q. B. D. 79 (Eng. 1875); Sargent v. Slack, 47 Vt. 674

(1875); Cloyd v. Steiger, 139 Ill.

41, 28

N. E. 987 (1891); O'Keefe v. Talbot,

84 Iowa 233, 5o N. W. 978 (1892); Arrington Bros. v. Fleming, 117 Ga. 449,
43 S. E. 691 (1903); Vaughn v. Bixby, 24 Cal. App. 641, 142 Pac. 100 (1914).
3 Ware Cattle Co. v. Anderson Co., 107 Iowa 231, 77 N. W. 1026 (1899).

4Broadwater v. Blot, 3 E. C. L. 216 (Eng. 1817); McCarthy v. Wolfe,

40 Mo. 520 (1867); Kemp v. Phillips, 55 Vt. 69 (1883); Wood v. Remick, 143

Mass. 453, 9 N. E. 831 (1887).
$Cummings v. Mastin, 43 Mo. App. 558 (1891); Pearce v. Sheppard,
24 Ont. 167 (r893); Shropshire v. Sidebottom, 30 Mont. 4o6, 76 Pac. 941 (1904);
Mattern v. McCarthy, 73 Neb. 228, 102 N. W. 468 (19o5).
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sence of fault on his part, or in other words, that he had exercised
such care as was required by the nature of the bailment? Or does
he shift back to the plaintiff the burden of proceeding further, by
simply stating how the loss occurred, leaving it to the plaintiff to
prove the negligence? The recent English case of Coldman v.
Hill6 not only seems to support the first proposition, but to extend
its application. The facts involved were that a farmer accepted
certain cattle for agistment, which later were stolen without any
default or negligence on his part. However, after learning of the
theft, he neither notified the owner, nor did he make any attempt
to recover them by search or notification to the police. The
Court of Kings Bench reversed the decision of the lower court,
which had held that the burden of proof was upon the plaintiff,
to show that the defendant's omission to act subsequent to the
disappearance of the cattle was negligence which caused the loss
of the cattle. There was evidence that even had the defendant
taken these steps, the cows would not have been recovered. The
case thus stands for the following propositions: (a) that when
there is a loss of agisted cattle, the onus is on the agister to prove
that it was not due to his negligence. And although he may
clearly show that the cattle got out of custody and control without
any fault on his part, yet when there is only a temporary loss
and he has taken no steps towards recovery, he must (b) also show
that had he taken such steps he would not have recovered the
cattle and prevented the final loss.
The American cases, broadly speaking, are not in accord with
the above case, nor would the principles therein laid down admit
of such an interpretation. In the case of Casey v. Donovan,7 the
Court held, that although the bailor made out a prima facie case,
by showing that the property delivered to the bailee was not returned to him on demand, and that this prima facie presumption
of negligence satisfied the burden of proof which rested with the
bailor, nevertheless the burden of proof of the bailee's negligence
always remained with the bailor. And in Calland v. Nichols,s
where a number of cattle died while in the bailee's charge, the
mere statement of that fact was held as a sufficient accounting
on the bailee's part, and the burden of proof of negligence was
upon the bailor. In many other cases the law is laid down, that
an agister is only bound to exercise care in preserving and protecting the property while in his custody, and he may relieve himself
from liability in case of a loss by showing that the property was not
lost by reason of his negligence. 9 In no case has the difference
6 1 K. B. 443 (Eng. 1919).
65 Mo. App. 521 (1896).
8 30 Neb. 532, 46 S. W. 631 (189o).
9
Union Stock Yard Co. v. Mallory Co., 157 Ill. 554, 4 N. E. 888 (1895);
Rayl v. Kreilich, 74 Mo. App. 246 (1898); Parlato v. Thomas, 123 N. Y. S.
373 (igio); Grout v. Meyer, 91 Neb. 845, 137 N. W. 844 (1912).
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been drawn between a temporary and a complete loss, so as to
shift the burden of proof in one case and not in the other. It
seems that although the burden of proceeding with the evidence
may shift, yet if the liability of an agister is founded upon negligence, as treated by the American cases, the burden of proving
negligence should be upon the plaintiff, and remain upon him
throughout the trial. And it certainly is the universal rule, that
when the plaintiff alleges specific negligence in caring for his animals, he must prove the allegation.1O A few jurisdictions require
that the bailee show that he has exercised such care as is reasonably required by the nature of the bailment. In such states the
plaintiff need not allege negligence on the bailee's part, its absence
being a matter of defense, and to exonerate himself the defendant must show due care. The reason being, that when property
is not returned by the bailee, it would be a very difficult thing for
the bailor to show in what way the loss occurred, or that it had
actually occurred by the negligence of the bailee, or his employees.
The bailor not being so likely to know what caused the injury or
loss as would the bailee in whose possession the bailed property
was." However, there is undoubted authority 2 that an agister
must notify the bailor of any unusual risk to which his cattle are
exposed, or of any change in conditions by which his property
might be harmed. On this ground there may be some reason for
the court's decision in the principal case.
J.H.C.
10

Crawford v. Cashman, 82 Mo. App. 554 (igoo); Shropshire v. Sidebottom, supra.
11Hudson v. Bradford, 91 Ill. App. 218 (i9oo); Bagley v. Black, 154 S. W.
247 (Tex. 1913); Nutt v. Davison, 54 Col. 586, 131 Pac. 390 (1913).
12 McLain v. Lloyd, 5 Phila. i95 (1863); Kemp v. Phillips, supra;Nutt v.

Davison, supra.

